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Supply chain security: minimizing risks in CI/CD pipelines
Security2 min read
This interview with security writer Fabian Deitelhoff explains why software build pipelines (CI/CD) are attractive targets for attackers. It also gives practical steps to make them safer.
What the interview covers
A CI/CD pipeline is the automatic system that builds, tests and publishes software. If attackers break into it, they can steal login data or publish fake packages under the name of a trusted provider. Deitelhoff says teams should check the whole path from source code to release, not only their own code. A green build alone does not prove the software is safe.
Key facts and examples
- A pipeline mixes three things: code that runs, login secrets, and permission to publish.
- Pipelines also run outside code such as third-party Actions, build tools, install scripts and their dependencies.
- In a campaign called wfx-loot (reported in November), attackers used stolen GitHub login data to add harmful code to workflows.
- In 2025, existing version tags of the tj-actions/changed-files action were pointed to harmful code. Workflows ran this code without any change to their own settings, and secrets ended up in build logs.
Key terms explained
GitHub Actions are small reusable automation steps that run inside a project's build workflow. A version tag is a label, such as v1, that points to a specific version of code. If someone changes what the tag points to, users who trust the tag may run new, harmful code without knowing it.
Three steps to harden a pipeline
- First, get an overview: which outside code runs, what does it download, and what rights does it have? Start with jobs that can publish or reach production.
- Second, limit rights and separate environments. A test run for an outside pull request needs no publishing secrets. Build, test and publish should run separately. Replace long-lived keys with short-lived access where possible.
- Third, check changes firmly. Pin dependency versions, protect workflow files, and keep an update process. Someone must review new versions and respond to security alerts.
Why it matters
Attacks on pipelines can reach many customers at once, because the harmful software goes out through the normal release path and looks trusted. Teams that only review their own application code may miss these risks. The interview shows that small helper tools can also become a way in.
Glossary
- GitHub Actions
- Reusable automation steps that run inside GitHub project workflows.
- tj-actions/changed-files
- A shared GitHub Action that lists which files changed; it was compromised in 2025.
- wfx-loot
- A named attack campaign that used stolen GitHub logins to insert harmful code into workflows.